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Wealth and Democracy
It wasn’t supposed to be like this. The present that we are living in is not the
future that we were promised. Wealth was not supposed to be so unequal, and its
inequality was not supposed to be such a problem for democracy. Thinking about
wealth today means taking stock of a rude awakening.
Of course, to put it this way simplifies the matter dramatically. But let us
take it in steps. To recite a cultural history that readers already know as cliché – but
not less true for its familiarity – the 2014 appearance in English of Thomas Piketty’s
Capital in the 21st Century alerted Americans to a body of research that had been
developed over more than a decade, showing both income and wealth growing
sharply more unequal around the world. The strongest data concerned the wealthy
countries of the North Atlantic, where inequality has been growing since roughly
1970 and, Piketty warned, a new rentier class of inherited wealth and social prestige
is on the verge of emerging.
As his most acute respondents have pointed out, Piketty’s work opens many
more questions than it answers.1 My major concern here is what growing inequality
means for democracy and the rule of law, a topic where Piketty himself is more
suggestive than informative. Others have focused on disaggregating Piketty’s
findings: how much comes from real-estate, from first-wave returns to technological
innovation, and so forth. Both sets of questions are necessary in moving from
measuring inequality to assessing it.
Inequality, as a merely formal or statistical feature of the economy, is not
good or bad; it becomes good or bad only as it affects those things that people value
and have reason to value. Indeed, inasmuch as the word “inequality” in common use
implies something bad, a problem, it is a derivative concept, taking its intelligibility
from some (explicit or implicit) idea of what would count as an appropriate kind of
equality. And because wealth is itself an instrumental good, valuable only because it
enables people to have and do things that they value, any idea of an appropriate
level of inequality will presuppose a series of things: what wealth enables one to do
in a given society, which things wealth cannot buy, which things are available
regardless of wealth, and, of course, what kinds of things are important to be able to
have and to do. Part of this web of presuppositions is the conception of citizenship
implied in any picture of democracy: what it means to have standing in the political
community and among other private individuals, and how wealth structures these
relations.
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To diagnose unequal wealth, then, one must disaggregate its effects and
relate them to a scheme of values and the institutions that embody those values –
such as schemes of social provision, market-making and market-limiting rules, and
so forth. Another kind of disaggregation is also essential, this kind concerned less
with the effects of wealth than with its sources. To do anything with respect to
unequal wealth, one must know something about what causes it and what kinds of
interventions are possible around those causes. How much inequality of wealth is
the result of simple rent-seeking, such as featherbedding by executives and
compensation committees? How much comes from broader political choices, such
as tax policy or laws governing labor unions? How much is a structural result of
technological innovation, or of globalization, or of some persistent dynamic in the
spectrum of economic orders that we call “capitalism”? How much is specific to
changes in a specific area of the economy, such as real estate, and are such changes
basically contingent, or are they symptoms of some structural dynamic? For any of
these sources, but particularly the last two, how much political space is open to
mitigate the effects of inequality, and at what cost?
Moreover, both questions – what does wealth mean and where does it come
from? – are all the more important in how they interact. To put the question in a
way that is somewhat over-stylized, how do capitalism and democracy interact? Is
there a tendency toward rising economic inequality that erodes putative
commitments to civic equality? Does civic equality presuppose and require certain
economic arrangements – whether laissez-faire, social-democratic, or otherwise?
This, of course, is not a question that could be answered once and for all: because it
concerns dynamic interplay between two spheres of braided equality and inequality
(broadly, the economic and the political), it might get a different answer at any
moment in time, depending how events had played out to that point, what kinds of
institutions were in place, and so forth.
Although this last question, the issue of interacting spheres, is sweeping and
elusive, it is also the most important, because it joins the work of explaining and
assessing wealth inequality with the work of acting on it.
Wealth and Democracy in the Age of Kuznets and Keynes
The rediscovery of massive and growing wealth inequality brings an
inconvenient realization: much of the thinking of recent decades has been subtly
inflected by empirical premises that seem to be turning out false. First among these
is the expectation that economic inequality in developed countries should settle at
stable and tolerable levels. This expectation was crystallized in the famous “Kuznets
curve,” named for economist Simon Kuznets, which found (based on a limited
sample of mid-century tax records in the United States) income inequality growing
for a time, then leveling off. Soon matched by doppelgangers such as the
“environmental Kuznets curve” (which showed pollution rising early in the
development process, then falling as wealthy societies adopted environmental
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regulations), the Kuznets curve came to be a kind of macroeconomic emoji for
optimism about the social meaning of economic growth.
If the first vulnerable promise belonged to Kuznets, the second can be fairly
identified with economist John Maynard Keynes: the benign statist assumption that
expert governance has more or less wrestled economic vicissitudes to the ground
and is now firmly in control of economic life. Although the core of Keynes’s
contribution to post-war economic governance was the management of business
cycles through demand stimulus (via public spending or relaxed interest rates), it
rested on a larger image of political and social life in which, as Keynes famously put
it, the “economic problem” (basically the problem of scarcity) was on the way to
being solved.2
Taken together, these two premises describe the common sense of the North
Atlantic countries in the “thirty glorious years” following World War II, when high
rates of growth, effective national controls on the international movement of capital,
and a strong political role for organized labor resulted in widely shared prosperity.
(There were important exceptions to the trend of economic inclusion, notably
African-Americans in the United States, but it was typical of the time that these, like
certain other pockets of poverty or social vulnerability, were regarded as exceptions,
and the assumed solution among elites was to incorporate them into a system
generally regarded as working for everyone.) This common sense implied that
there was no great reason to expect wealth inequality to be self-compounding, and
that, if inequality did grow, no reason that a democratic political order should not be
able to sort it out.
This is not to say that there was perfect complacency, but that the
conceptualization of issues at the intersection of private wealth and public power
assumed that they were soluble: of a manageable scale and subject to powerful tools
of governance. For instance, John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, published in 1971,
devoted a bit more than two pages to “the fair value of political liberty,” that is, the
problem of ensuring that formally equal rights to political participation should not
be undermined by unequal economic power.3 Rawls recognized that unequal
political power might arise from unequal economic power, then entrench itself in
the legal rules of the game (both political and economic).4 He responded with what
was in effect a strong expression of the Keynesian assumption: in its distributive
capacity, government should maintain an ongoing re-sorting of wealth to avoid
excessive concentrations of economic power, while also using public financing of
elections to sustain boundaries between the political process and private wealth.
All of this appeared in Rawls’s thought as, in effect, an important administrative
problem for a post-war state assumed to have the power, expertise, and legitimacy
to carry it out. Rawls offered no sustained reflection on the ways that unequal
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wealth might arise from within, or break free of, a basically social-democratic state
and impose its own logic of power throughout both economic and political life. 5
Rawls wrote that if such questions arose, they would “belong to political
sociology,” rather than to his theory of justice.6 But the thought that a theory of
justice could set aside problems of “political sociology” got the point exactly
backward, at least in one key respect. Rawls’s theory of justice had the appeal that it
did because it could presuppose a political sociology characterized by the
assumptions of Kuznets and Keynes. It could stand as an idealizing and rationalizing
account of a certain kind of post-war state, one poised to manage economic life so
thoroughly as to make economic processes thoroughly objects of political choice and
control, rather than allowing them to become agents of political power and change.
To write of the economy as Rawls did, as the site of distributive shares, to be
organized by rules that allow only those inequalities that benefit the least
advantaged, while also treating the choice between socialism and private ownership
as an open one, assumes that economic life is basically a plastic object of regulation,
not a source of barriers to, and disruption of, the political project of justice.
Because it rests on these (in hindsight) heroic assumptions, Rawls’s project is
in some sense the apogee of a body of thought that preceded the post-war period by
many decades but came to its fullest flowering then. This line of thinking expected
to see the importance of the distinctively economic domain of life diminish as
scarcity receded and humanity emancipated itself from material insecurity.
Whatever organizing principles scarcity and self-interest imposed on economic life
would turn to be, in effect, transient features of a passing era.
In its liberal version, this tradition owed a key debt to John Stuart Mill. In his
Principles of Political Economy, Mill argued that the era of money-making and
business-driven busyness that he was living through would prove an anomaly, an
historical peculiarity. In good time, Mill predicted, people would recognize that
their material needs had been met by growing social wealth, and would turn to
other priorities, the “higher pleasures” of refinement, self-unfolding, and noninstrumental personal relationships. The forecast was consistent with Mill’s
tendency toward an optimistic, humanist libertarianism woven into the fabric of a
perfectionist utilitarianism. In Mill’s account, social life, the realm of sociability that
is defined neither by the instrumental rationality of the marketplace nor by the
formality and sovereign authority of politics, would spontaneously and fluidly
implement post-economic, humanistic priorities – for no greater, or lesser, reason
than that women and men would grow bored of money-making and appreciate that
Rawls returned to the topic of the fair value of the political liberties in Political
Liberalism (1993, 356-63), where he also sounded a note of concern about trends to
inequality: “[T]he invisible hand guides things in the wrong direction and favors an
oligopolistic configuration of accumulations that succeeds in maintaining unjustified
inequalities and restrictions on fair opportunity” (267).
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they had better things to do with their lives. A culture devoted to making money
had something wrong with it, Mill reckoned, and the perspicacity of free individuals
would recognize this and set it right.
Keynes’s forecast in “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren,” that the
problem of scarcity might be overcome after another century, was little more than
an extension of Mill’s argument, augmented by intervening decades of compound
growth. Keynes proposed that the defining question of collective life would no
longer be how to create wealth, but rather how to use leisure. The most socially
prized people would be those who showed others gracious, edifying, and
pleasurable ways to spend their time and powers toward non-accumulative ends.
Keynes even suggested, following Mill and perhaps waxing a bit mischievous, that
the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself, having exhausted its social usefulness, could
be handed off with a shudder to experts in mental disorders. Like Mill, Keynes
seemed to imagine that tastes for leisure and refinement would assert themselves
organically once material needs ceased to be pressing. The engine of capitalist
wealth-production would slow and cease, having used up its fuel of human cupidity.
By the end of the 1950s, the engine had not even slowed. This was the puzzle
that Keynesian economist John Kenneth Galbraith set himself in one of the twentieth
century’s major American social-theoretic treatments of wealth, The Affluent Society.
Galbraith argued that Keynes’s utopia of leisure had not arrived for two reasons.
First was the perverse persistence of economic insecurity in a wealthy society:
although the United States was rich enough to provide a decent and secure living for
all, economic life continued to be shadowed by the prospect of vulnerability and
deprivation for those who fared badly. Galbraith argued that whatever rationale
these fearsome incentives might have had in an earlier, poorer era that needed to
make a priority of economic growth could no longer apply in the age of affluence.
The feeling of scarcity and vulnerability was a kind of collective neurosis in
economic life – albeit one given a very real material basis by lawmakers’ failure to
provide security for Americans in the form of social provision and protection in
their employment.
Second, Galbraith sought to explain the unsettling fact that the appetite for
consumption of material goods had not abated, even as the economy provided
nearly everyone with levels of material prosperity that, a century or even fifty years
earlier, would have seemed to solve the problem of material want. Here he
introduced a kind of deus ex machina: the advertising industry produced new wants
in pace with economic production, artificially keeping consumer demand high
enough to stoke the engines of industry. Galbraith distinguished between those
wants that preceded the production process and those that, as he described it, were
created as part of the production process itself. He argued that human happiness
could be fostered just as much by avoiding the creation of new wants as by
satisfying those wants once they existed: after all, the sum of satisfied wants is a
joint product of the level of wants and the degree of their satisfaction, and one may

5

produce full satisfaction as easily by subtracting inessential desires as by
multiplying means of satisfying them.
The weak point in Galbraith’s account is the would-be distinction between
natural and artificial desires. There is, to be sure, something important here; but it
is not enough to say that desires without an old pedigree have less weight than
those known to Homer and the Victorians. The reasons are familiar from Marx and
from market-oriented technological optimists alike: in a deep way, human life is a
joint product of the organic and the inorganic, our individual bodies and
personalities and our collective technologies of production. We create ourselves
and discover our potential – our powers, desires, and discontents – through an
historical process of innovation. This innovation sets in motion a constant series of
revolutions – technological, political, cultural, and at the level of consciousness itself.
People had, at one time, not heard of racial equality, same-sex marriage, or safe and
effective control over reproduction; but there is nothing deficient in our demands
for these things today.
In Galbraith’s view, then, wealth was both an achievement and a problem;
but the problem lay essentially in the fact that the society had not yet matured
enough to take full advantage of wealth’s revolutionary humanitarian potential. The
way to do this would be by legislating, rather than simply waiting for, the culture of
leisure and refinement that Keynes had forecasted. The legislation would take the
form of social provision, in personal security (job protection and pensions, for
example) and public goods, the latter cultural as well as infrastructural. This was, in
effect, the theoretical version of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society: a
program for a humanistic, post-material utopia of lifelong education, leisure,
reflection, and self-development.7 Galbraith identified a vanguard for this change:
what he called the New Class, a social stratum whose members valued work as a
source of intrinsic satisfaction and self-expression, rather than a hard bargain of
instrumental labor in exchange for unrelated wants. This population was already
moving into the post-material world of satisfaction in activity rather than things, in
doing rather than consuming. The goal of any affluent society, Galbraith argued,
should be to usher as many of its people as possible into this class, and so to realize
the emancipating potential that wealth represented.
In Galbraith’s account, as in Rawls’s, there is a clear assumption that the
Keynesian state stands ready and able to realize the potential of affluence to solve
the problem of scarcity and release people into a post-scarcity society. Both of these
assumptions – the availability of a post-scarcity situation and the capacity of the
state to usher it in – came under pressure from both left and right in the decades
following Galbraith’s 1958 book.
Doubts from the Left: Positional Goods and the Persistence of Scarcity
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Fred Hirsh’s Social Limits to Growth made both cases in [1974]. Hirsch, an
economist and former International Monetary Fund official, argued that Keynesian
optimism had rested on a pair of assumptions that turned out to be historically
contingent – and, increasingly, no longer held. First was that the lion’s share of
economic demand would be for goods that served classically material needs, such as
food and shelter. Economic growth straightforwardly serves more of these needs as
it progresses: more food, bigger houses with more bathrooms, more consumer
electronics, and so forth. But, Hirsch argued, economic development brought
growing emphasis on positional goods, goods whose capacity to satisfy their owners
or consumers is relative to what others have. Affluence created a paradox: the value
of positional goods was eroded precisely by increasing material wealth, so that the
satisfaction produced by economic growth was often a matter of two steps forward,
(at least) one step back.
Positional goods were mainly of two kinds. First were material goods subject
to congestion, such as cars and suburban houses – goods that appeared luxurious
when few people had them, but turned out to be much less enjoyable when widely
distributed, precisely because wide distribution meant crowded roads and clogged,
increasingly remote suburbs. Inasmuch as economic growth produces positional
goods, it constantly undermines its own promise: what one sets out to achieve is
less satisfying once one finally gets it.
Hirsch’s second type of positional good is the pure positional good, the thing
that is scarce by its nature, such as leadership positions or other bases of prestige.
Hirsch’s lead example was higher education. As material wealth increases, ever
more spending flows into competition for positional goods, which do not increase in
number (at least not in proportion to the increase in overall wealth). With
increased competition for positional goods, pressure increases on universities to
serve as sorting institutions, allocating leadership positions, prestige, satisfying
work, and so forth. Results include longer certifying processes, increasing rates of
matriculation, (one might add today) rising tuition, and, at the heart of the matter,
years spent in education that is purely instrumental to achieving a positional good,
or, even worse, purely defensive – like a home-security system, a way of avoiding a
loss, the loss in this case being a decline in social standing. All these uses of wealth
to pursue positional goods are, Hirsch argued, mainly social waste. Such waste is
unavoidable in a materially wealthy society with a highly uneven topography of
positional goods. Because of positional goods, economic growth does not overcome
scarcity, but displaces it from the straightforwardly material sphere to the
positional sphere.
Hirsch’s second paradox takes us to the crucial issue: the interaction between
capitalism and democracy. Hirsch argued that the traditional agenda of economic
development, associated with a broadly utilitarian state (whose policies were to be
laissez-faire under the Benthamite dispensation, managerial in the Keynesian
incarnation), was coherent only because of invisible but indispensable boundary on
the domain of economic self-interest. Individual economic actors were expected to
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pursue their self-interest to the full, but always within the rules of the game, while
principled and public-spirited officials were charged with enforcing those rules in
an even-handed fashion. But these boundaries would prove unstable. Absent some
independent social morality, there was no reason for people, professions, and
industries not to try to game and change the rules in their favor. Reciprocally, there
was no guarantee that officials would not put the rules up for sale, if not crudely and
nakedly, then in the familiar, revolving-door style of capture that has become
familiar in the capitalist regulatory state. There was reason to expect these trends
to quicken as the status of economic self-interest as a sole and sufficient account of
rationality eroded the quasi-religious social ethics of businesspeople and
professionals and the mandarin noblesse oblige of public officials. Such extramarket social ethics, Hirsch argued, was the implicit sociological linchpin of the
regulated market that the Keynesian state supported; but the market’s logic tended
to undercut this sine qua non of its own regulation.
For these reasons, Hirsch argued, political intervention would be necessary
to create a social state in which prosperity would not undercut its own promise. As
he put it, the market provides a range of choices to the individual, but only politics
provides the power to choose among multiple ranges of choices, that is, to shape the
playing field and the rules themselves in a deliberate way. And individual choice
alone would prove insufficient to deliver the promised escape from scarcity and
insecurity. It is interesting, in hindsight, that Hirsch felt it urgent to make this case:
in his view, a benign and effective regulatory state could no longer be assumed, and
this at the very moment when growing evidence suggested that market-led
economic growth could not fulfill its promise without political intervention.
From the (center-) Right: Doubts about Democracy and Neoliberalism’s Rise
Part of the difficulty was this. Throughout the twentieth century, as the
regulatory state took on ever-greater importance as the assumed linchpin of
political economy, it was losing plausibility as a vehicle of democratic feedback. A
line of argument widely broadcast in the United States by Walter Lippmann and
Joseph Schumpeter held that actually existing mass democracy could not instantiate
any idealistic conceptual account of collective self-rule. Voters were ill-informed,
emotional, and often in sway of fantastical confusion. Majorities were contingent
and transitory. Even at its most lucid, the will of the majority was simply visited on
the minority with the arbitrary decisiveness of authoritarian dictates. The idea that
democracy involved a collective body deliberately choosing its direction was
insupportable outside certain exceptional and archaic circumstances, such as the
Greek polis or Swiss canton. The most optimistic account one could give of
democracy was to describe majoritarian elections as a rule of decision to resolve
contests among rotating bands of elites – the position Schumpeter adopted.
Lippmann took a gentler tone but was not much more optimistic, describing popular
majorities as weighing in occasionally on questions of great moment – not all that
rationally, but more or less decisively – but otherwise little connected with the
activity of governance, which was the work of institutions, not populations. These
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arguments appeared between the 1920s and the 1940s: by the 1970s, a
sophisticated body of public-choice literature portrayed government as, in effect, a
subset of economic life: a congeries of rent-seeking by industries and constituencies,
power-accumulation by bureaucrats, and, at worst, utopian flights of reformist fancy
free of the discipline that cost-internalization imposes on private decisions. Hirsch
thus wrote in a world in which Galbraith’s rather easy assumption of a legitimate,
effective, and benign state was under considerable intellectual pressure.
Recognizing the need for regulation was already a matter of reclaiming contested
ground, not simply bathing in near-consensus.
The most polemical, sustained, and – in hindsight – emblematic attack from
the right on Great Society optimism came from Friedrich Hayek. Hayek argued that,
contrary to promises of post-material security, an economy could do its work only if
it maintained a measure of insecurity and arbitrariness, and that social provision
did not complete the promise of economic development, but instead undercut it.
Hayek argued that the economy should be understood as an information-processing
system, conveying data about the relative scarcity of goods, time, and talent, and the
extent and intensity of desire for them. Effective communication of this data laid the
groundwork for rational decisions about the trade-offs between possible uses of
resources that are the ligature of economic life.
The key to this informational function was the price mechanism, which
expressed the kaleidoscopic facts of economic life in uniquely succinct and usable
form. Prices could do this work only if they were in fact allowed to coordinate
decisions about distribution and use of resources: every redistributive or regulatory
mandate clogged and diverted the flow of information, turning a healthy vascular
system of data into a swampy delta of drifting decisions. The consummation of
secure prosperity that Galbraith sketched would be, in effect, the end of economic
life as Hayek described it, and its eclipse by the bureaucratic life of an administered
state. One could expect such a state to be inefficient, arbitrary, and actuated by
envious and irrational passions, quite unlike the relatively lucid instrumental
rationality that the price system enforced on market choices. Faced with a choice
between liberalism – which for him meant the classical economic liberalism of
laissez-faire – and democracy, Hayek argued, one should prefer liberalism. The
more democracy developed in the directions that Galbraith and Hirsch urged, the
more it might force the choice.
On the strength of these arguments, Hayek has become the exemplar of the
approach to political economy often called neoliberalism. The heart of this revival
of classical economic liberalism is the claim that there is no viable alternative to a
market system, and therefore any attempt to use state power to do what Galbraith
presupposed and Hirsch urged – to choose collectively among sets of choices – is an
error. Less a program or system of thought than a constellation of programs united
by an intellectual mood, neo-liberalism is sometimes bolstered by the claims that
markets secure liberty and equality (which Hayek argued), fairness (which he did
not), or welfare (which he did, but in qualified form), but the heart the neo-liberal
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position is a negative one: there is nothing much for the state to do but make and
maintain markets. Ambitious political projects will undermine liberty, equality,
fairness, and welfare together. A market regime is the least-worst for all of these
values. This is, increasingly, the intellectual mood in which revelations of growing
inequality have appeared.8
One of the major divisions in today’s political economy must come over why
the forecasts of Keynes and Galbraith did not come true. Was it because Hayek’s
recuperation of market theory, combined with a long-running theoretical demotion
of democracy, was intellectually right, and sensible policy-makers saved the world
from incipient statism? Or was it because, as Wolfgang Streeck has argued, capital
revolted against the broadly social-democratic mid-century accommodation that
thinkers like Galbraith assumed and sought to perfect?9 Put differently, is the
surging inequality of recent decades a feature of the best of possible worlds, or of a
world where a relatively egalitarian regime was recently dethroned and false
necessity reigns, enforcing an undue impression of inevitability in the very market
arrangements that produce and sustain inequality? Obviously, the stakes of this
question are not small. They concern whether the inequality-generating logic of
economic life limits and conditions the possible forms of democracy or, on the
contrary, the real possibility of democratic decisions about the shape of the
economy has been suppressed by a counter-democratic revolt of capital.
A Step Back: The Long History of Markets, Democracy, and Social Life
The recognition that markets have their own logic, which imposes an order
on social activity and allocates resources and capabilities among social groups, and
which may conflict with other principles of social organization and distribution, is
basically a nineteenth-century one, although it appears in germ in works as diverse
as Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on
Inequality (aka, the Second Discourse). As David Grewal argues in his forthcoming
Invention of the Economy, modern social and political thought, going back to roots in
the seventeenth century but flowering in the latter part of the eighteenth, is marked
by a pair of contrasting utopias, two pictures of how a society of equally free people
might coordinate its common life. The economic utopia, associated especially with
Adam Smith and David Hume, envisions a non-coercive structure of cooperation
emerging organically, in the form of proto-legal rules of property and contract akin
to the structures of grammar. Such rules require no central authority to create or
specify them; rather, they are, so to speak, pre-programmed into human nature
(again, in the manner of grammar) and manifest themselves under the pressure of
increasing interdependence and social complexity. This is the origin-point of a
laissez-faire conception of social order in which mutuality of interest, coordinated
Grewal & Purdy “Introduction” to Law & Contemporary Problems issue on
Neoliberalism and articles therein.
9 Streeck, Buying Time
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by commonly recognized rules, enables people to structure their lives around
obligations freely and rationally assumed, without arbitrary imposition.
Grewal’s other utopia is political. The political utopia is founded on
citizenship and sovereignty. The emphasis on sovereignty reflected the view that
the organizing principles of social life arise from the binding decision of what
Thomas Hobbes identified as the sovereign. A sovereign, for Hobbes, was not
necessarily a monarch or any other specific institution. Rather, it was an
analytically necessary feature of any legal and political order. In such an order,
there must be some entity with the power to make, interpret, and enforce its rules, a
holder of the last word. This was the sovereign, whatever form it took in any polity
(court, council, assembly, monarch, etc.). The political utopia is a utopia of equal
citizenship: each person has an equal share in the production and legitimation of the
sovereignty, and thus of the rules that shape their common life.
At a deep level, the clash between the two utopias was rooted in conflicting
accounts of the relationship between law and human nature. Smith and Hume’s
naturalistic jurisprudence tied a uniquely functional and beneficial set of laws to an
account of human beings as organically intertwined through sociability, a
disposition to join in bonds of mutual interest and intelligibility. Law was a product
of human cooperation, not its precondition, and the range of laws that would
emerge from organic cooperation at any stage of economic development was
narrow enough that one could speak of it as a domain of natural law. By contrast,
Hobbes’s positivism denied the possibility of an organic, emergent law: the
epistemic situation of uncertainty and mutual endangerment that Hobbes famously
diagnosed as the “state of nature” (that is, a social world imagined without law) was
as far as horizontal, spontaneous encounters would take people. The conditions of
mutual intelligibility and assurance that cooperation required could arise only
through legislation and enforcement of law by a third party outside the would-be
cooperators, that is, the role of sovereign. (Of course, the sovereign, as an artificial
juristic entity, might just be the will of a majority of members of the political
community. This was precisely the idea of the political utopia of equal citizenship.)
Law and social order, were therefore constructed in quite a radical sense: nothing
about them was natural except the need for them.
In later developments, the two utopias have, of course, not existed as pure
types, but rather as regulative principles, asymptotic ideals that have motivated
competing schools of thought. Nonetheless, when one asks into the relationship
between markets and citizenship, one is speaking within this tradition of conflict,
asking how far the contemporary extensions of one version of a society of equally
free persons constrain and distort the ambitions of the other version.
The two utopias coexist in social and legal thought with a third ideal-type of
social life, which is organic and horizontal, in the manner of Hume and Smith, but
does not find its consummation in the market. This vision has its exemplary
twentieth-century expression in Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation, which
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portrays laissez-faire doctrine as artificial dogma, achieved only through aggressive,
state-led reform. The organic form of social cooperation is not that of the market,
but arises from loose reciprocity and deeper ties of solidarity. These motives
produced a “moral economy” that included ideas of just prices and wages, various
forms of security, and, above all, forms of obligation that were ethical, religious, and
emotional as well as, and often rather than, self-interested.
From this point of view, the state is neither the source of ordering principles,
as for Hobbes, nor the superintendent of market order, as for Smith and Hume.
Instead the state would be either the guardian of organic patterns of reciprocity or
the battering ram of disruptive, market-making reforms. Polanyi is famously
associated with the formula “Laissez-faire was planned,” but it is just as illuminating
to see him as arguing that planning was spontaneous: society mobilizes in its own
defense.10 Less abstractly, people mobilize to defend security and established
patterns of social relations, and, quite naturally, call on the state to help them in
doing so.
The point of this taxonomy is that there is no pre-theoretical formulation of
the question of democracy’s relation to unequal wealth. The question depends on
one’s conception of democracy, and also on one’s conception of economic order.
The stronger one’s commitment to a idea of robustly equal citizenship, and the more
strongly one supposes that a political community might choose among a range of
economic orders, the more unequal wealth seems to foreclose the work of a
sovereign polity, predisposing political judgment in favor of the present economic
regime. Conversely, the more one sees politics and law as handmaidens to a
naturalized set of market relations, the less is at stake in unequal wealth among
citizens. While the eighteenth-century naturalization of markets was affirmative,
claiming to root rights of property and contract in human nature and providential
design, and the twenty-first century version is more likely to be negative – asserting
that “there is no alternative” to markets on account of incentives, information costs,
or some other constraint on institutional design – the basic logic remains: the
demotion of political sovereignty by the naturalization of market economics, which
in turn demotes citizenship to a symbolic status rather than a substantive part in
collective governance.
Among nineteenth-century figures who identified a basic conflict between
market order on the one hand and social or political community on the other –
those, that is, who rejected the naturalization of markets – there were two
predominant responses. One, associated with Karl Marx and various strands of
revolutionary socialism, sought to absorb economic life fully into the community of
equal citizens, that is, to overcome the distinction between the political and
economic domains and dissolve all forms of unequal economic power into the
sovereign power of democratic politics. The other, associated with Progressive
Cite to this language. I am indebted to Tim Shenk for the observation about the
spontaneity of planning.
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reformers in the United States and in Europe with certain strands of social
democracy and, later, Christian democracy, took the opposite approach, using the
political power of the state to strengthen the boundary between economic relations
and non-economic social life, notably in the domains of the family, education,
culture, and professional activity. While the first approach updated and radicalized
the utopia of equal citizenship, the second represented a compromise between the
two utopias and, in the style of Polanyi, a political defense of non-market orders in
the reproduction of biological, social, and cultural life. The latter was the basic
strategy of the accommodation that structured post-War life in the twentieth
century.
Trans-Atlantic social democracy, then, was more social than democratic. It
took seriously the quest for security in a relatively familiar, stable, and manageable
social world, whether that of the factory, the union, the neighborhood, the university
or profession, or the family. Through pluralistic representative institutions, it
sought to maintain a reasonable balance among interests conceived of through these
collective categories, even as, through the period, rights-based claims to greater
individual liberty and the end of various caste systems also proliferated. Its basic
strategy of reform – not premeditated, but consistent in application – was to open
up existing institutions of representation and advancement to previously excluded
groups while also redefining the state’s relation to individuals through an
increasingly homogenous and libertarian scheme of negative rights. It all seemed to
be working well enough – until a reassertion of market principles and market power
began to break down the barriers protecting various secure domains of social life
and revealed the lack of power, or will, in the democratic state to reassert their
protection.
The Poverty of Our Philosophy
All of this is to emphasize the peculiar situation in which wealth is now
emerging as a political issue. Unequal wealth is widely (though by no means
universally) recognized as an urgent question even as the terms of the problem
remain ill-defined, to the point that it is difficult to say just what is at stake in it.
Much of the thought that we have about wealth and its relationship to democracy
comes from the anomalous period of the mid-twentieth century, when that
relationship seemed to have been resolved in practice, even as resources –
intellectual and institutional – for dealing with conflicts between the two were being
eroded.
Yes even in this theoretically impoverished situation, theories of wealth and
democracy are doing a lot of work. Consider the Supreme Court’s implicit theories
of markets and democracy in its First Amendment cases concerning money in
politics. The Court’s ready assimilation of money to speech assumes that there is, in
principle, no conflict between political argument and economic accumulation, that
these are compatible, even mutually supportive, dynamics. The Court’s embrace of
for-profit corporations as essential participants in the process of American
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democracy also highlights its confidence that there is no contradiction between the
accumulation of great wealth and the survival of effective self-rule.11
And why would the justices think that? The key may lie in an implicit theory
of what self-rule is. The Court’s rulings holding that campaign-finance regulation
cannot be justified by the goal of equalizing influence among citizens or (the obverse
of the same principle) avoiding “distortion” of political debate by moneyed interests
indicate that its conception of democracy excludes the robust idea of equal
citizenship at the heart of what I have called the utopia of sovereignty. Instead, the
Court’s concerns appear basically Schumpeterian: to avoid the entrenchment of a
political class through self-serving campaign laws, even at the cost of ensuring the
entrenchment of a class of wealth donor-citizens who effectively set policy – that is,
in Schumpeter’s terms, facilitating elite rotation while declining the romantic idea
that ordinary citizens should, or can, participate in self-government in any
meaningful way. The patronage relationships that Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens
United (rather more the first, despite the notoriety of the second) produce between
massive donors and their preferred candidates and movements are exemplary
Schumpeterian politics, intra-elite disruptors that change the menu of choices for
the mainly passive voters.
This is just one example of the work that implicit theories of wealth and
democracy are already doing sub silentio – and, hence, one piece of evidence for the
need for explicit engagement with these questions. And what might that
engagement look like? Here I suggest four strategies for starting out with deficient
resources for thinking through these problems – up from poverty, as it were.
1/ Life-Cycle Analysis: This term is usually applied to assessment of
industrial processes, but I mean it in a different, mischievous but also entirely
serious sense. One of the most provocative, if underdeveloped, features of Piketty’s
Capital is his account of the life-prospects and likely priorities of young people in
societies with various levels of wealth. Drawing on nineteenth-century fiction, he
shows that, past a certain level of inequality, “careers open to talent” gives way to
“marriage open to ambition,” that is, that the key to a good life is winding up in the
right, highly capitalized family, whose advantages ability and hard work cannot
match. In such a society, ambition, effort, and esteem all flow toward established
concentrations of wealth, with predictable consequences for the quality of the
professions, the hierarchy of prestige, and, to name elusive but real qualities, the
texture of social sentiment and imagination.12
Now carry the same kind of question from personal life to the political
activity of democracy. What kinds of leaders does a highly unequal democracy
produce when wealth flows freely into campaigns? As Zephyr Teachout has
emphasized in her important book, Corruption in America, the flip side of “free”
11
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spending by the wealthy is dependence on the part of candidates, who need money
for political survival. The result is not usually the outright bribery that the Supreme
Court classifies as “corruption” – the only evil it permits campaign spending laws to
address – but a subtler reorientation of attention and concern. One might think of it
by analogy to the ways one sees and hears in a crowded room: where does the eye
go, which voices does the ear pick up? Who, a day later, does one remember was
there? In a democracy that depends on private wealth for its basic activities of
communication and mobilization, candidates see and hear the wealthy, because they
need them. The careers of Bill and Hillary Clinton since the end of his presidency
may serve as emblems of this economy of attention: although they remain standardbearers of the more egalitarian of the two major American parties, they have spent
fifteen years relentlessly cultivating the company, attention, and largesse of the
world’s wealthiest people. That, after all, is how things get done.
2/ Disaggregating Wealth: In principle, the same disparities in purchasing
power might have many different meanings, depending on certain distinctions. Of
the basic goods of life, which (A) must be purchased, (B) are guaranteed without
purchase, and (C) are protected from monetization and may not be purchased at all?
The more robust a set of social guarantees (category (B)), such as guarantees of
education, basic security in one’s person, health care, and retirement, the less
wealth matters, even if it grows more unequal. Conversely, the more basic goods
must be purchased on the market, the more differences in wealth put lives on
divergent courses, quite apart from talent, effort, need, or whatever else one regards
as an appropriate distributive criterion.
Of course these categories are dynamic, and wealth produces potential
demand for differentiation in such goods. This is why category (C), the nonmonetizable category, is so important. Particularly important is whether political
influence, the basic feedback mechanism that determines revisions in these
categories, is itself monetizable. Where it is, wealth will tend, other things equal, to
become more salient across all categories of goods.
3/ Recognizing the Primacy of Politics: The Legal Realists were right, as was
Hobbesian positivism long before they wrote: economic life takes its shape, and
property rights – including claims to wealth – arise only within the legal framework
that political action creates. Rough-and-ready conventions for certain resources
may arise in small and tight-knit groups, particularly against a backdrop of state
definition and enforcement of other claims; but where there is conflict or
uncertainty beyond such a community – that is, where there is anything resembling
complex economic activity – someone must decide, and that someone is sovereign.
This is a decisive argument against any radical naturalization of economic claims.
Of course this argument remains very far from implying that anything goes in
the political creation of the economy. From Hayekian arguments concerning the
informational complexity of economies to liberal claims about autonomy to
conventional neo-classical economists’ worries that no system gets far without
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appealing to self-interest, there may be decisive reasons to organize any given area
of economic life along market lines. The point is that this is a choice – a political
choice. The utopia of property-and-contract, of market sociability and reciprocity,
runs through the utopia of equal citizenship, of political sovereignty, and any case
for it must be made there.
4/ The Democratic Pivot: This point returns the discussion to what remains
its crux. What does it mean to submit basic economic questions to political
judgment, and what is the most one might hope to accomplish there? The answers
depend on how one understands political processes, and how robust a set of goals
one believes democratic sovereignty, the utopia of politics, can support.
These goals come in two dimensions. First is the conception of citizenship as
a form of social membership: what kinds of security, empowerment, opportunity,
access to institutions, and so forth should be guaranteed to every member in good
standing of the social order? This political economy of citizenship, as Joseph Fishkin
and William Forbath show in this volume, goes all the way back in the United States,
and has a distinctive social-democratic version in the twentieth century (identified
in the US with the New Deal) whose future is now in considerable doubt.
The second dimension of citizenship concerns active self-rule: how far, after
the doubts that marked twentieth-century thought and demoted political judgment
to an undisciplined mix of self-interest and fantasy, can a polity actively shape its
own economic life, making the rules of material interdependence a matter for choice
rather than happenstance?
Unless one is a thoroughgoing fatalist, it seems fair to infer from the last
seven decades that there is a range of possibilities along both dimensions. The
social-democratic accommodation of the mid-twentieth century represents a
genuine alternative to a marketized social and political order. This is true despite
whatever social democracy’s internal failures were (notably failures of inclusion),
and despite the doubts that its decline raises about its sustainability in the face of
marketizing pressure. As noted earlier, however, social democracy, always had
more to do with securing a strong form of social membership for citizens than with
the active political supervision of economic life: it was, to repeat, more social than
democratic. This may have been its Achilles heel.
There may, however, be something essential to learn from social democracy
about self-governance. This is the importance of organized people, as opposed to
abstractly empowered individual citizens. Proposals to increase the influence of
citizens – for instance, by allocating campaign-contribution credits to each adult as a
way of matching the influence of the wealthy – are admirable and likely to be
helpful; but they also share the neoliberal emphasis on the choosing individual as
the pivot of collective life – a de-collectivized view of collective life, in which
aggregating individual choice is the whole work. By contrast to this neoliberal
vision, the pluralist politics of the social-democratic states rested heavily on
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intermediary institutions, notably labor unions, to provide virtual representation
and, perhaps as important, to create bonds of identification around common
interests and agendas. Such institutions may be key features of a “political
sociology” that could make active self-rule a more plausible ideal for a roughly
majoritarian system.
Here, however, one encounters the next challenge. As discussions of
Piketty’s proposed global annual wealth tax highlighted, the scale of wealth
accumulation and transfer is now worldwide in its basic dynamics. Sovereignty
remains almost exclusively a phenomenon on the national scale. Indeed, social
democracy was marked, as much as anything, by being the mode of social life that
arose when strong working-class movements in relatively rich societies could
sustain their victories because capital was mostly contained within national
borders. Today, inequality resembles climate change in its formal dimensions: a
global problem at which national political order often flails ineffectually. As David
Grewal has pointed out, because we work in circumstances more closely resembling
those of the last Gilded Age than of the mid-twentieth century, we might recall that
many of those who confronted the contradictions of wealth and democracy in that
earlier time identified their problems and goals as international, and their
movements and strategies, therefore, as internationalist.13
It would be an overreaction, though, to surrender the field of domestic
politics. Here, as in other respects, we are unavoidably in a posture of
experimentation. The long-neglected question is what kind of democratic relation
to economic life is possible. Precisely because of the neglect, the novelty (or at least
renewed sense of urgency) of the issue is the greater, and all responses are partly on
unfamiliar ground.
Conclusion:
Inequality, as Jeffrey Winters reminds us, is very old – indeed, so far,
perennial. Democracy is rather arrestingly new, mass democracy especially so.
Manhood suffrage is 100-150 years old even in the “mature” democracies. Women’s
suffrage is a product of the twentieth century. In the United States, effective
enfranchisement of African-American and Latino citizens dates to the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and policies such as denying former felons the vote
continue to qualify the right. Allowing for the economic catastrophe and political
turmoil of the Great Depression and the ideological bloodshed of World War Two, it
may be that close to half of the human experience of widespread and stable mass
democracy occurred in the halcyon years when economic inequality seemed to be in
abeyance, and even economic scarcity seemed on the path to being overcome.
Thinking about wealth and democracy has been informed by the optimistic
premises of that time, in what it has not said as well as in what it has.
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I have noted that the twentieth century’s experience of “actually existing
democracy” coincided with sharp theoretical skepticism toward the idea that a
majoritarian representative system could credibly be claimed to embody collective
self-government. This might have been more troubling had it not been for optimism
that inequality and scarcity, those recurrent sources of conflict, were now subject to
rational and humane administration. The social-democratic accommodation
between democracy and capitalism seemed a good-enough arrangement as long as
it was stable. To the extent that inequality and scarcity could be mastered, a
pluralist, administered democracy promised to be self-rule enough.
The question to ask today at the intersection of wealth and democracy is not
simply whether wealth might be mastered again, so that it would let democracy
proceed in peace. The more basic question is whether growing social wealth could
become a means to an enriched democratic future. Taking that question seriously
would mean reclaiming the mid-century goal of a world after scarcity, with widelyshared prosperity spurring proliferating self-development and experiments in
living. The thought contained in that older goal was that twentieth-century
democracy was becoming a post-materialist form of life: individuality was more
central than collective self-rule to this conception of democracy, but, in a world that
seemed to have stabilized in a tolerable form, that was good enough. [Today the
dominant expressions of individuality have come apart from democracy and lodged,
instead, in neoliberal, non-democratic celebrations of economic power: either the
world-making creativity of the entrepreneur or the self-development and
humanitarianism of the rentier.14 The first is the denuded economic Nietzscheanism
of Schumpeter, dressed up in the style of Silicon Valley. The second is mid-century
Great Society humanism without the society, a life of leisure, reflection, and
intrinsically valuable activity for those who happen to have the resources (often
enough inherited) to pursue them.]
Fred Hirsch’s analysis of positional goods gives powerful reason to believe
that the end of scarcity will not come through the raw accumulation of total social
wealth. Positional goods will continue to make rich people (objectively rich on the
spectrum of historical human experience) feel not-nearly-rich-enough. This
dynamic only becomes more intense with the marketization of essential resources
for social reproduction, especially education, health care, and child care: as pressure
from growing overall material wealth increases the relative cost of these laborintensive goods, the prospect of being unable to afford them (at least in decent
quantity or quality, which are of course socially relative standards) will haunt
economic life, making the threat of relative scarcity acute.
Hirsch’s analysis suggests, then, that making wealth more socially beneficial
will require revitalized governance. There would have to be a meaningful
commitment to social provision of the goods that are necessary to social
reproduction and also vulnerable to intensified relative scarcity, such as health care,
14
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education, and child care. There would also have to be significant social limitation
of inequality. This would mean limits on the accumulation of great fortunes, such as
those of George Soros, Bill Gates, and Sheldon Adelson, who can effect their own
foreign policies; but it would also mean constraints on the difference in resources
and social capacity that divide roughly the “fifteen percent” of well-educated
professionals and mid-level executives from the “eighty percent” that includes more
or less everyone else except the actually rich. Under the present dispensation, the
attack on privilege too often means breaking down the residual structures of
security that defined the mid-century social vision, and throwing, for instance, the
tenured and professionally certified onto an unregulated market. This levelingdown of traditional social protections and stabilizing institutions is a signature
neoliberal move. It only intensifies susceptibility to the dynamics that Hirsch
diagnoses. A more apt response would be to level up social provision and other
forms of security, reducing the effect of relative scarcity, while limiting raw
economic inequality to ease the pressure for differentiation in the availability and
quality of these goods.
At the time of writing, it is an increasingly common perception that economic
inequality must be brought under control for democracy to realize, or recover, its
potential. As we have seen, this claim depends on one’s conception of democracy;
but it is highly plausible for any conception of democracy that aims at meaningful
version of collective self-rule, rather than simple elite rotation. The argument
developed here suggests something further: that robust democracy is necessary if
wealth is to realize its potential for social benefit. Indeed, democracy must be able
to intervene in the definition, creation, distribution, and use of wealth precisely to
make the benefits of wealth real. A political scheme of social provision, and political
limitations on the scope of inequality, are the most plausible means to prevent
growing wealth from undercutting its own benefits. This idea is not extremist: it
simply states the logic of the mid-century social-democratic accommodation that
established a measure of security and a pattern of widely shared economic growth.
It does, however, insist on the priority of that political logic. The free play of the
market will not deliver the goods that market-led growth in wealth is conventionally
celebrated for producing. Only democracy can do that. In this sense, wealth needs
democracy if it is to fulfill its humanitarian promise. The irony is that, ill-handled,
wealth can also overwhelm democracy and undercut its own humane potential.
Of course, these abstractions are only ways of naming human powers. We – a
we that does not really exist yet, as a political matter – are the only ones who can
make a better world from the braided elements of economic and political life. Both
domains are, at the moment, potent, unequal, and opaque. For decades, respectable
thought has regarded them with an understandable but also unsustainable blend of
cynicism and complacency. Now they need to become more equal and more lucid,
before their power is exhausted or fatally misused.
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